Friday, July 20, 2012

Israel: ETHNIC CLEANSING CONTINUES as Israel orders more water cisterns for Palestinians destroyed

IMEMC & agencies:

On Tuesday, the Israeli army raided Al Qanoub area in Sa'ir, eastern Hebron and issued a demolition order on two cisterns used to irrigate land for the benefit of twenty people, of whom more than half are children.

One cistern owned by Basem and Omar al-Shalaldais is used to irrigate farmland of more than 10 dunums containing 210 seedlings.
The other cistern owned by the family of Shaher al Shalalda's is used to water 5 dunums of land planted with 185 fruit tree seedlings.

The two cisterns were built with the aid of the Improving Livelihood in the Occupied Palestinian Territories Program funded by the Netherlands Representative Office.

Palestinians are rarely issued with planning permission to build on their own land in the occupied territories, while illegal Israeli settlements are free to expand without restriction.


http://imemc.org/article/63932




World Peace @WorldPeace2Day

Tuesday, July 17, 2012

Israel Opposes Humanitarian Work of U.N. Agency

The Israeli military’s department governing civil affairs in the occupied West Bank said Sunday that a UN agency’s humanitarian aid to displaced Palestinians is actually illegal, according to Ma’an news.
Israeli home demolition in the West Bank.  Source:  APJP.org.
Israeli home demolition in the West Bank. Source: APJP.org.

 
The role of the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in the West Bank is being reassessed by the department of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) within the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs according to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz.

COGAT spokesman Guy Inbar said that UNOCHA is assisting Palestinians who have had homes demolished by the Israeli government and that this humanitarian work is illegal.

Israeli authorities insist that Palestinians living in Area C, the 62 percent of the West Bank that is still under full Israeli control since the 1993 Oslo Accords, must follow the legal process for building in the West Bank and that NGOs working in the West Bank must follow those same legal procedures.

Human rights workers state that providing temporary tents to displaced families falls under universally accepted international definitions of emergency humanitarian assistance and is not a building project that would require a permit.

Humanitarian agencies and the United Nations argue that the reality is that it is almost impossible for Palestinians to obtain permits to either build or refurbish their own property. This is in stark contrast to Israeli settlers in the same area that are able to expand communities with impunity that have been repeatedly found to be illegal under international law.

One area of the West Bank facing repeated demolition orders are the hills south of Hebron. After a group of illegal Israeli settlers filed a legal petition calling for the removal of the village of Susiya, the Israeli military announced plans to demolish all 50 structures in the town.

Israeli authorities have so far demolished 330 Palestinian buildings in the West Bank in 2012, displacing 536 people, half of whom are children according to the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Richard Falk.

According to International Law and the Fourth Geneva Convention, occupying powers are forbidden from transferring its population into an occupied territory as Israel has been doing in the settlements. Occupying powers are also required to provide for the needs of the occupied population and are forbidden from demolishing any structure with a civilian purpose. The current Israeli military demolitions of Palestinian homes, in addition to being violations of international law, are also reminiscent of the destruction of homes in South Africa during apartheid.

"It is outrageous that (the Israeli) administration which condones illegal settlement construction is here using an argument against construction that helps some of the most disadvantaged communities, who have the right to protection under international law," a diplomatic source told Ma’an news.

COGAT asked the Israeli Foreign Ministry to lodge a formal complaint at the UN and on July 10th, Israel’s UN ambassador wrote to the UN humanitarian affairs chief asking for staff lists. Israeli authorities are purportedly considering limiting visas for foreign UNOCHA employees and stopping work and travel permits for Palestinian staff members, according to Haaretz.

COGAT spokesman Inbar said that the agency is upset that the UNOCHA is over stepping its bounds in Area C, while the UN counters that it is mandated to respond to humanitarian emergencies.

Saturday, July 14, 2012

#Israel ? : #Lebanon - Unidentified Spy Drone Downed In Eastern Lebanon.

An unidentified object thought to be a spy drone caught fire and crashed, eye-witnesses in the village of Younin in Hermel said.

A detachment of army, security and civil defense rushed to the scene to verify.

...read more
 

Thursday, July 12, 2012

Israel to deploy missile interceptor on Egyptian border

Source RT

Israel is to install a mobile air defense system at the Egyptian border, following cross-border attacks in the area, reports the Israeli media.
­The Iron Dome system is designed to defend against rockets fired from anything up to 70 kilometers away.
The radar allows the system’s operators to pinpoint the targeted site of the enemy rocket.  Each interceptor costs between $50,000 and $100,000.
The system has been used against Palestinian rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip in the past and this time "will be placed near Eilat as part of an operational deployment program which includes changing the locations of the batteries from time to time,” according to an Israeli military spokeswoman.
­

Israeli-Egyptian ties go sour

­Israeli relations with its neighbor have grown tense since the popular Egyptian revolution and the ousting of the President Hosni Mubarak last year.
Since then there’s been an increase in the number of cross-border attacks. Israel has laid the blame on Egypt when two rockets fired across the frontier struck Eilat recently. Egypt has denied the accusations. In June, unidentified gunmen crossed Egypt's Sinai border and murdered an Israeli worker.  Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak called the incident “a disturbing deterioration in Egyptian control of security in the Sinai” reports the Washington Post.
Last month’s Muslim Brotherhood victory in the Egyptian presidential elections has raised concern in Israel that its strategic 1979 peace agreement with Egypt could be in jeopardy.
Israel's peace deal with Egypt, which ended decades of hostilities, is believed to be one of the cornerstones of Israeli security.
So far, Egypt has endorsed the deal by keeping the Sinai Peninsula essentially demilitarized. 
Meanwhile the newly-elected Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi stated his desire to befriend Israel’s arch enemy – Iran by reconsidering the peace accord with Israel, a move that raised eyebrows in Jerusalem.


Israeli man jailed in U.S. for trafficking human kidneys from Israel


An Israeli man who pleaded guilty to illegally brokering kidney transplants for profit in the United States, the first such conviction under federal law, was sentenced on Wednesday to 2-1/2 years in prison, prosecutors said.


Levy Izhak Rosenbaum, a 61-year old Israeli citizen who lived in Brooklyn, pleaded guilty last October to charges that he brokered kidney transplants between paid donors and recipients on three occasions.


Related articles:

Prosecutors said Rosenbaum charged between $120,000 and $150,000 to help three New Jersey residents find kidneys for transplant between 2006 and 2009.


He also pleaded to a count of conspiracy to broker a fourth kidney transaction following a sting operation leading to his arrest involving an undercover FBI agent who pretended to have a sick uncle.


Prosecutors said Rosenbaum typically found donors in Israel through newspaper advertisements who were willing to give up a kidney in exchange for payment, and that he helped arrange the necessary blood tests to ensure a match and for the donors' travel to the United States.


As part of his service, he also helped donors and recipients invent a cover story to trick hospital staff into thinking the donation was a purely altruistic exchange between friends or relatives, which is legal, rather than an illegal business deal, according to prosecutors.



מבצע המעצרים במסגרתו נלכד רוזנבאום (צילום: יוסף פפר, אתר אתרוג)
Police raids in which Rosenbaum was arrested (Photo: Yosef Pepper, Etrog website)

At least one relative of a kidney recipient spoke in defense of Rosenbaum at the hearing at the US District Court in Trenton, New Jersey, on Wednesday, saying he was a hero who helped save her father's life, local media reported.


But at least one of the donors, who agreed to cooperate with the government's case in exchange for immunity from prosecution, described to the court that he felt exploited by Rosenbaum.


Paul J. Fishman, the New Jersey US Attorney, whose office prosecuted the case, said Rosenbaum was motivated by profit, not the saving of lives. ...read more

Sunday, July 8, 2012

Wikileaks: Israel - SUBJECT: SENIOR MFA AND MOD OFFICIALS DESCRIBE COMPLEX RELATIONS WITH JORDAN

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TELAVIV2425.html

VZCZCXRO8566
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #2425/01 3081213
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041213Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4098
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 7015
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0652
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002425 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KISL KWBG JO IS
SUBJECT: SENIOR MFA AND MOD OFFICIALS DESCRIBE COMPLEX 
RELATIONS WITH JORDAN 
 
REF: A. TEL AVIV 2234 
     B. TEL AVIV 2227 
     C. AMMAN 2353 
     D. AMMAN 2352 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) ( 
d) 
 
1.  (S) Summary.  In separate meetings October 28 and 29, MOD 
Pol-Mil Director Gilad and MFA Deputy Director General Hadas 
described different aspects of Israel's complex relations 
with Jordan.  Gilad effusively praised security cooperation 
with Jordan, calling it the "main pillar" of Israel's 
security, although he acknowledged tensions over Jerusalem 
and described Israeli-Jordanian ties as "peace with the 
regime, not the people."  Gilad said he had urged the 
Jordanians to moderate their public comments on Israeli 
security measures in Jerusalem's Old City.  Hadas stressed 
that Israel has no intention of undermining Jordan's role in 
Jerusalem, and he described quiet cooperation between the 
Israel National Police and the Jordanian Waqf in maintaining 
order on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif.  Hadas blamed 
Jewish extremists as partly responsible for stirring up 
trouble in the Old City, but stressed that the INP are going 
to great lengths to avoid exacerbating the situation.  Hadas 
sharply criticized public statements by Jordanian officials 
accusing Israel of tunneling under the Al-Aqsa Mosque, noting 
the the GOJ knows perfectly well that Israel has no intention 
of harming the Islamic holy places.  He described the 
situation as Jordan complaining if Israel acts to maintain 
order on the Haram, while the Waqf would lose control to 
Islamic radicals if Israel did not act.  Hadas suggested that 
Jordanian Prince Ghazi is prviding King Abdullah with 
inaccurate reports abou Israeli actions in Jerusalem.  The 
King knows Irael will not "set the Mount on fire," but does 
ot talk to Israelis directly.  Hadas asked the U.S to send 
a message to the Jordanians that Israelhas no intention of 
changing the status quo on th Haram and that better 
cooperation is needed on he Jordanian side.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (S) MOD Pol-Mil Director Amos Gilad, in an October 28 
meeting with Deputy Special Envoy Fred Hof and PolCouns, 
praised Jordan's security role as "exceptional," and called 
Jordan the "pillar" of Israel's security.  The GID is very 
successful in preventing Jihadi terrorists from launching 
attacks against Israel from Jordan.  Gilad said he personally 
has "great relations" with the Jordanian army commander as 
well the GID director.  Gilad acknowledged that the 
Jordanians have become very angry about Jerusalem, but he 
said he has urged them to lower the tone of their rhetoric. 
Gilad said the Israel National Police are doing a great job 
in maintaining order on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, and 
are conducting their operations with great sensitivity, but 
the Jordanians cannot admit this publicly.  Gilad commented 
that with regard to both Jordan and Egypt, Israel has "peace 
with the regimes, but not with the people."  Gilad concluded 
that it was difficult for him to imagine Israel's security 
without Jordan. 
 
3.  (C) MFA Deputy Director General for the Middle East Yacov 
Hadas-Handelsman, a former ambassador to Jordan, assured 
PolCouns October 29 that Israel has no intention of 
undermining Jordan's role in Jerusalem.  Hadas-Handelsman 
noted, however, that the Jordanians have a much broader 
interpretation of Article Nine of the Israel-Jordan peace 
treaty, and even sometimes assert a Jordanian right to a role 
in the handling of Muslim sites in West Jerusalem, such as 
the Mamilla Cemetery, which Hadas-Handelsman insisted falls 
under sovereign Israeli control. 
 
4.  (C) Turning to the disturbances on the Haram 
al-Sharif/Temple Mount over the Jewish High Holidays, 
Hadas-Handelsman blamed "provocations" by a small group of 
Jewish extremists whom "no one in Israel pays any attention 
to," for triggering a countering action by members of the 
Northern Branch of the Israeli Islamic Movement (refs A and 
B), whose leader, Sheikh Raed Saleh, Hadas-Handelsman said is 
banned from entering Jordan.  He said the Jordanian 
Government is well aware that the GOI and INP would not allow 
any Jewish extremist assault on the Haram.  He described the 
situation as one in which Jordan complains if Israel acts to 
maintain order, but Jordan will lose control of the Haram if 
Israel does not act. 
 
5.  (C)  Hadas-Handelsman said the Jordanian Waqf is in 
regular contact with the INP.  The Waqf must cope with 
efforts by a range of groups, including the Israeli Islamic 
Movement, Hamas, the generally non-violent but nonetheless 
ideologically extreme Hizb Al-Tahrir, and elements of the 
 
TEL AVIV 00002425  002 OF 002 
 
 
Palestinian Authority, which are all vying for control of the 
Haram.  The Waqf frequently asks the INP to help them control 
these elements, but then criticizes Israeli actions publicly. 
 Hadas-Handelsman gave the example of clashes at the Mughrabi 
Gate entrance of the Haram on October 25, during which he 
said INP actions were carefully coordinated with the Waqf, 
which received assurances that the police would not enter the 
mosques.  As a result, the disturbances were contained with a 
minimal number of injured and a few arrests. 
Hadas-Handelsman said the MFA was angered by a statement the 
same day by Jordanian Information Minister Sharif, who 
accused Israel of "fanning the flames" in Jerusalem. 
 
6.  (C) PolCouns mentioned reports earlier in October that 
King Abdullah was considering withdrawing the Jordanian 
Ambassador from Israel.  Hadas-Handelsman noted that he was 
aware of these reports, adding that the Jordanians had said 
nothing to the GOI directly, but had instead briefed the U.S. 
Ambassador to Jordan, whom they knew would discuss it with 
the Israeli Ambassador.  Hadas-Handelsman described Prince 
Ghazi bin Muhammad, who serves as King Abdullah's adviser on 
Islamic affairs, as "increasingly religious" and as someone 
who tells the King that Israel is "up to no good" in 
Jerusalem.  Hadas-Handelsman commented that in his 
assessment, King Abdullah knows full well that Israel has no 
intention of provoking a crisis in Jerusalem, but the King at 
this point is not talking directly to Israelis.  He 
complained that Jordanian officials are compounding the 
problem by publicly asserting that Israel is tunneling under 
the Haram in an effort to cause the mosques to collapse. 
This kind of rhetoric further poisons Jordanian public 
opinion, which the GOJ then cites as the reason for their 
need to adopt tough positions against Israel. 
 
7.  (C) Due to the tenuous nature of the Jordanian-Israeli 
political relationship, Hadas-Handelsman said it would be 
helpful if the U.S. would convey to the Jordanian leadership 
that Israel has no intention of undermining Jordan's role on 
the Haram, Israel seeks better dialogue and cooperation with 
Jordan on issues of mutual concern, and Israel has no 
intention of changing the status quo with Jordan. 
Hadas-Handelsman said the INP remains in close contact with 
him, adding that the MFA is actively encouraging the INP to 
try to accommodate the Waqf whenever possible. 
 
8.  (S) Comment.  Gilad and Hadas-Handelsman appeared to be 
describing relations with two different countries.  As is 
increasingly the case with Egypt as well, the 
Jordanian-Israeli security relationship remains robust while 
political relations are deeply troubled.  At some point, the 
security relations will also be affected if the political 
ties continue to unravel.  Israeli assurances, including a 
recent statement by PM Netanyahu denying any Israeli 
tunneling under the Haram, appear to fall on deaf ears in 
Jordan due to a lack of Jordanian trust in the GOI.  We 
welcome Embassy Amman's assessment of how a U.S. message 
along the lines requested by Hadas-Handelsman would be 
received by the Jordanians. 
CUNNINGHAM

Friday, July 6, 2012

Wikileaks:SUBJECT: FURTHER DETERIORATION IN SOUTH LEBANON

O 011150Z APR 85
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2456
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 01974 
 
E.O. 12356:  DECL:  OADR 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IS LE SY US
SUBJECT:  FURTHER DETERIORATION IN SOUTH LEBANON 
 
REF:  BEIRUT 1961 
 
1.  (U) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.  HEAVY FIGHTING 
IN THE SIDON AREA CONTINUED ON MARCH 30-31 CAUSING 
NUMEROUS CASUALTIES.  ACCORDING TO MOST REPORTS 
REACHING BEIRUT, THE FIGHTING, WHICH FOLLOWS 
RECENT LF-LAF CLASHES IN THE AREA (REFTEL), 
INCLUDED THE STRONG, DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF ARMED 
PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS FOR THE FIRST TIME. 
 
2.  (U) WIDELY PORTRAYED HERE AS PART OF AN 
ISRAELI PLAN TO REDISTRIBUTE THE POPULATION OF 
SOUTH LEBANON AND TO FORM A PREDOMINANTLY 
CHRISTIAN BORDER SECURITY STRIP, THE CLASHES IN 
SIDON HAVE PREOCCUPIED LEBANESE GOVERNMENTAL, 
POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS OVER THE 
WEEKEND.  PRIME MINISTER KARAMI CALLED INDIRECTLY 
ON THE U.S. TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO HALT THE 
ALLEGED ISRAELI PLAN.  SYRIAN MILITARY 
INTELLIGENCE CHIEF GENERAL KHOLI IS EXPECTED IN 
BEIRUT TODAY, APRIL 1, TO DISCUSS RECENT POLITICAL 
AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. 
END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. 
 
2.  (U) FIGHTING INTENSIFIED IN THE SIDON AREA ON 
MARCH 30-31 BETWEEN LF MILITIAMEN AND LAF UNITS. 
ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, HOWEVER, THE LAF'S 
ROLE WAS ECLIPSED WHEN PALESTINIAN UNITS BASED IN 
THE REFUGEE CAMPS TOOK A STRONG, ACTIVE ROLE IN 
THE FIGHTING AGAINST THE LF. 
 
3.  U) ON MARCH 30, THE LF REPORTEDLY BEGAN 
HEAVY, ALMOST CONTINUOUS SHELLING OF THE REFUGEE 
CAMPS AT AYN AL-HILWAH AND MIYAH MIYAH AND OF 
OTHER RESIDENTIAL AREAS IN SIDON.  PRO-ARAFAT 
PALESTINIAN FORCES, BACKED BY OTHER MUSLIM 
MILITIAS, RESPONDED AND HEAVY FIGHTING ENSUED. 
SIMULTANEOUSLY, CLASHES BETWEEN THE LF AND LAF 
WERE REPORTED ALONG A LINE INCLUDING KANAYA, 
KAHAYA, HLALIYAH, AND BRAMIYAH.  THERE ARE ALSO 
REPORTS OF AMAL UNITS TAKING PART IN THE FIGHTING 
IN SIDON, BUT WE HAVE NO DETAILED INFORMATION. 
THE MARCH 30 CASUALTY TOLL AMOUNTED TO 
TWENTY-EIGHT KILLED AND FORTY WOUNDED, MOSTLY 
CIVILIANS. 
 
4. (U) ON MARCH 31, THE FIGHTING CONTINUED, WITH 
THE MOST INTENSIVE ACTION CENTERED AROUND THE AYN 
AL-HILWAH REFUGEE CAMP.  ACCORDING TO FOREIGN 
CORRESPONDENTS CITED IN THE LOCAL PRESS, THE CAMP 
CAME UNDER HEAVY SHELLING FROM LF ARTILLERY 
POSITIONS NEAR JEZZIN.  HEAVY FIGHTING WAS ALSO 
REPORTED BETWEEN LF UNITS AND LAF POSITONS ON MAR 
ELIAS HILL. THE MARCH 31 CASUALTY TOLL AMOUNTED TO 
FIVE KILLED AND FIFTEEN WOUNDED.  THERE ARE 
UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS 
FLEEING THE CAMPS FOR SIDON ITSELF AND OF SUNNI 
AND CHRISTIAN RESIDENTS OF SIDON MOVING NORTHWARD 
TO BEIRUT. 
 
5.  (U) ELSEWHERE IN THE SOUTH, ISRAELI UNITS 
REPORTEDLY CROSSED BACK INTO PREVIOUSLY EVACUATED 
TERRITORY FOR THE SIXTH TIME AS PART OF A DRAGNET 
OPERATION IN THE IQLIM AL-TIFFAH REGION SOUTH OF 
SIDON.  LENGTHY LOCAL PRESS REPORTS INDICATE 
TWENTY-THREE PERSONS KILLED AND FORTY-FIVE PERSONS 
WOUNDED, MOSTLY IN THE VILLAGE OF JBAA. 
 
6.  (LOU) IN THE ONLY OTHER SIGNIFICANT FIGHTING 
OVER THE WEEKEND, LAF UNITS EXCHANGED ARTILLERY 
FIRE WITH PSP MILITIAMEN ON MARCH 30 ALONG THE SUQ 
AL-GHARB/AYTAT RIDGELINE FRONT SOUTHEAST OF 
BEIRUT.  TWO LAF SOLDIERS WERE REPORTEDLY KILLED. 
WHEN THE SHELLING SPILLED OVER ONTO THE 
EAST-BEIRUT RESIDENTIAL AREAS OF BAABDA, 
HAZIMIYAH, AND MKALLAS, SEVERAL SHELLS HIT JUST 
OUTSIDE THE PERIMETER OF THE AMBASSADOR'S 
RESIDENCE AT YARZE.  EMBASSY PERSONNEL HAD ALREADY 
TAKEN REFUGE IN THE SHELTER. 
 
7.  (U) EFFORTS TO HALT THE DETERIORATION OF THE 
SITUATION IN SOUTH LEBANON PREOCCUPIED LEBANESE 
GOVERNMENTAL, POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS 
THROUGHOUT THE WEEKEND.  ACCORDING TO PRESS 
REPORTS, FOLLOWING A MEETING ON MARCH 30, 
PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, PRIME MINISTER KARAMI, AND 
SENIOR LAF OFFICERS DECIDED TO REINFORCE LEBANESE 
ARMY UNITS IN THE SOUTH, IN PART WITH EQUIPMENT 
NOW BEING DELIVERED FROM THE U.S.  MINISTERS HOSS 
AND BARRI, WHO TRAVELED TO DAMASCUS MARCH 31 TO 
MEET WITH SARG VICE PRESIDENT KHADDAM AND DRUZE 
LEADER JUMBLATT, HAVE DEMANDED SUCH A 
REINFORCEMENT OF LAF UNITS IN THE SOUTH FOR 
SEVERAL WEEKS. 
 
8.  (U) FOLLOWING THE MARCH 30 MEETING, PRIME 
MINISTER KARAMI ACCUSED ISRAEL OF PROVOKING THE 
VIOLENCE IN SIDON "IN THE HOPE OF OBTAINING A NEW 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION (ON A CONFESSIONAL 
BASIS) AND EVENTUALLY ESTABLISHING A BUFFER ZONE 
(ALONG THE BORDER STRIP)."  STATING THAT THE 
SITUATION IN THE SOUTH MUST BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE 
REGIONAL CONTEXT, KARAMI SAID THAT THE GOL WOULD 
UNDERTAKE CONTACTS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHICH 
HAVE INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. 
 
9.  (U) NOTING THAT "THE UNITED STATES IN 
PARTICULAR CAN ACT TO CLEAN UP THE SITUATION," 
KARAMI ADDED THAT THE GOL HAD NOT/NOT BEEN 
INFORMED OF A VISIT TO LEBANON BY ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY MURPHY DURING THE LATTER'S FORTHCOMING 
TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST. 
 
10. (U)  SHIITE AMAL LEADER NABIH BARRI DENOUNCED 
THE INTENSIFICATION OF FIGHTING IN SIDON IN 
ESSENTIALLY THE SAME WORDS AS KARAMI.  "ISRAEL," 
HE SAID, "AIMS AT PROVOKING A NEW DEMOGRAPHIC 
REDISTRIBUTION AND TO RESHAPE ITS FRONTIER WITH 
LEBANON SO THAT THE CHRISTIANS IN SIDON AND JEZZIN 
ARE MOVED TO THE BORDER ZONE AND THAT THE MUSLIMS, 
MORE PRECISELY THE SHIITES, ARE FORCED BACK INTO 
THE INTERIOR OF LEBANON."  "IT IS IN THIS 
CONTEXT," BARRI ADDED, "THAT ONE CAN UNDERSTAND 
THE RECENT EVENTS IN SIDON AND ORDERS WHICH WERE 
GIVEN TO THE 'INTIFADA' (I.E., JA'JA'S CHRISTIAN 
DECISION MOVEMENT)..." 
 
11. (U) IN A MARCH 31 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH 
SARG PRESIDENT ASSAD, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AGREED TO 
RECEIVE A SYRIAN ENVOY TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN 
SIDON AS WELL AS RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
WITHIN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY.  SYRIAN MILITARY 
INTELLIGENCE CHIEF GENERAL KHOLI IS EXPECTED TO 
MEET WITH GEMAYEL TODAY, APRIL 1. 
 
12. (C) COMMENT.  THE CONTRADICTORY AND 
TENDENTIOUS REPORTS REACHING BEIRUT ABOUT THE 
FIGHTING IN SIDON ARE DIFFICULT TO UNRAVEL AND 
EVALUATE.  PALESTINIAN UNITS DO APPEAR TO BE 
TAKING AN ACTIVE PART IN THE CLASHES.  IN SHORT, 
THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH APPEARS TO BE 
DETERIORATING, AS EVERYONE HAD FEARED, INTO A 
HEIGHTENED LEBANESE/ISRAELI CONFLICT AND BITTER 
INTERCOMMUNAL CLASHES WITH PALESTINIAN 
INVOLVEMENT. 
 
LYNE


http://wikileaks.org/cable/1985/04/85BEIRUT1974.html

Wikileaks:SUBJECT: ISRAEL'S POLICY ON SOUTHERN LEBANON

O 121653Z JUN 85
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0184
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 08792 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: PREL LE IS
SUBJECT:  ISRAEL'S POLICY ON SOUTHERN LEBANON 
 
1.  CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
2.  SUMMARY:  MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL KIMCHE BRIEFED AMBAS- 
SADORS FROM UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND UNIFIL CONTRIBUTOR 
COUNTRIES JUNE 12 ON SOUTHERN LEBANON.  KIMCHE REITERATED 
ISRAELI POLICY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON LEADING UP TO THE 
WITHDRAWAL, THEN EMPHASIZED THAT ISRAEL WAS NOW OUT OF 
LEBANON AND, THEREFORE, NO LONGER IN CONTROL.  AS A RE- 
SULT, ALTHOUGH ISRAEL WAS TRYING TO BE HELPFUL, ISRAEL 
FELT THAT UNIFIL MUST WORK OUT THE PROBLEM OF THE FINNISH 
HOSTAGES WITH THE SLA DIRECTLY.  IF ISRAEL SOUGHT TO 
CONTROL EVENTS AND FORCE LAHAD TO RELEASE THE FINNISH 
SOLDIERS, ISRAEL WOULD, IN EFFECT, BE BACK IN LEBANON. 
THERE WOULD BE NO MORE SLA AND LAHAD WOULD BE FINISHED. 
SEVERAL AMBASSADORS SAID THEIR GOVERNMENTS CONSIDER 
ISRAEL TO REMAIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF THE UNIFIL 
SOLDIERS, AND MADE STRONG STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE AGAINST 
THE HOLDING OF HOSTAGES.  END SUMMARY. 
 
- 
3.  MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL DAVID KIMCHE INVITED THE AMBAS- 
SADORS AND CHARGES FROM THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER 
STATES AND THE CONTRIBUTORS TO UNIFIL TO A BRIEFING JUNE 
12 ON ISRAEL'S POLICY IN SOUTH LEBANON.  THE BRIEFING 
INVITATION WAS STIMULATED BY THE PRESENT CRISIS BETWEEN 
UNIFIL AND THE SOUTH LEBANESE ARMY.  KIMCHE SOUGHT TO 
PLACE THE ISRAELI REACTION TO THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE 
BROAD CONTEXT OF ISRAELI POLICY. 
- 
 
4.  ISRAELI POLICY ON SOUTHERN LEBANON 
-   ---------------------------------- 
KIMCHE OPENED BY NOTING THAT THERE IS A CABINET DECISION 
ON SOUTHERN LEBANON THAT CONTINUES TO BE THE BASIS OF 
ISRAELI ACTIONS, UNTIL THERE IS A CABINET DECISION TO 
CHANGE IT.  THE DECISION INCLUDES THE  FOLLOW- 
ING ELEMENTS:  A) THE IDF IS REDEPLOYED ALONG THE INTER- 
NATIONAL FRONTIER, AND NO IDF UNITS WILL REMAIN IN 
LEBANON ON A REGULAR OR PERMANENT BASIS.  B) THE IDF RE- 
TAINS FREEDOM OF ACTION AGAINST TERRORISTS BEFORE, DURING 
OR AFTER THEIR ACTIVITIES AGAINST ISRAEL.  C)  A SECURITY 
ZONE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, WITH ISRAELI LIAISON WITH LOCAL 
FORCES WHICH ARE DEDICATED AGAINST TERRORISM.  D)  IF THE 
LOCAL FORCES ARE ATTACKED THE IDF MAY RESPOND TO PROTECT 
THEM. 
- 
 
5.  ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH THE SLA 
-   ------------------------------- 
KIMCHE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS HELPED AND 
CONTINUES TO HELP THE SOUTH LEBANON  (SLA), 
BUT NO LONGER CONTROLS THE SECURITY ZONE.  HE SAID THE 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SLA IS ONE OF LIAISON AND ADVICE, 
BUT IT DOES NOT PERMIT ISRAEL TO GIVE ORDERS, AND THE SLA 
IS NOT A DE FACTO ISRAELI FORCE.  THE SLA IS LEBANESE, 
COMMANDED BY A LEBANESE GENERAL, AND IT BEHAVES AS THE 
LEBANESE BEHAVE, NOT AS ISRAELIS WOULD.  THIS MEANS THAT 
THE SLA OFTEN ACTS IN A MANNER WHICH IS  DISTASTEFUL TO 
ISRAEL. 
- 
 
6.  THE "UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT" WITH UNIFIL 
-   -------------------------------------- 
KIMCHE SAID THE GOVERNMENT OF  ISRAEL DEPLORES "THE 
UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT", AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT SETTLED. 
HE SAID ISRAEL HAS GIVEN THE FOLLOWING ADVICE TO THE SLA: 
A) NOT TO HARM ANY OF THE HOSTAGES; HE SAID THE SLA HAS 
COMMITTED ITSELF TO DO NO HARM TO THE FINNISH SOLDIERS, 
AND THIS IS BEING OBSERVED.  B) ISRAEL HAS ADVISED LAHAD 
TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF TALKS WITH 
UNIFIL.  HE SAID THAT THE ISSUE MUST BE RESOLVED BY UNIFIL 
AND THE SLA DIRECTLY.  ON NO ACCOUNT, HE EMPHASIZED, SHOUL 
ISRAEL BE A DIRECT PARTY.  ISRAEL IS OUT OF LEBANON; IF 
IT WERE TO DEAL DIRECTLY THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT ISRAEL 
IS STILL IN.  KIMCHE VOLUNTEERED THAT IT IS TRUE THAT 
ISRAEL STILL HAS LIAISON OFFICERS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, BUT 
HE ASSERTED THAT THE NUMBERS ARE FEWER THAN THOSE WHICH 
WERE ACCEPTED IN THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN 
WELCOMED BY MANY STATES INCLUDING EGYPT. 
- 
 
7.  THE UNIFIL-SLA MEETING 
-   ---------------------- 
KIMCHE SAID THAT THE MEETING BETWEEN GENERALS LAHAD AND 
PONS IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.  HE SAID THEY DIS- 
CUSSED THE RELEASE OF THE CAPTIVES; THE GOVERNMENT OF 
ISRAEL THOUGHT THEY SHOULD HAVE MET FROM THE VERY BEGIN- 
NING, BUT THIS MEETING AT LEAST WAS HELD IN A GOOD 
ATMOSPHERE.  THE GIST OF THE MEETING WAS:  LAHAD ASKED 
UNIFIL FOR THE ELEVEN SLA TROOPS TO BE BROUGHT TO A 
NEUTRAL PLACE WHERE IT COULD BE DETERMINED WHETHER THEY 
HAD IN FACT DEFECTED OR HAD BEEN CAPTURED AND TURNED OVER 
TO AMAL.  HE SAID THAT IF THE ELEVEN STATE THAT THEY HAD 
DEFECTED, THE FINNS WILL BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY BY LAHAD. 
IT HAD ALSO BEEN AGREED DURING THE MEETING TO APPOINT 
LIAISON OFFICERS BETWEEN GENERALS PONS AND LAHAD, AND 
UNIFIL HAD SECURED THE RIGHT TO VISIT THE FINNISH 
SOLDIERS EVERY THREE OR FOUR DAYS.  KIMCHE SAID, OF COURSE 
HE HOPED THE PROBLEM WOULD BE SOLVED BEFORE THAT TIME 
LIMIT.  KIMCHE CONCLUDED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS NOW 
UP TO UNIFIL TO BRING THE ELEVEN TO A NEUTRAL SPOT, 
PERHAPS NAQURA. 
- 
8.  GENERAL REMARKS 
-   --------------- 
KIMCHE OFFERED THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL REMARKS:  SINCE 
THERE IS NO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON, ISRAEL UNDER- 
STANDS THE NEED FOR UNIFIL TO HAVE RELATIONS WITH THE AMAL 
MILITIAS.  IN FACT HE SAID THIS IS A POSITIVE THING.  IN 
THE PAST UNIFIL HAD SAID THAT IT COULD DEAL ONLY WITH THE 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON.  BUT SINCE THAT PROVED 
IMPRACTICAL, AND UNIFIL IS NOW DEALING WITH AMAL, IT 
SHOULD ALSO DEAL WITH THE SLA.  HE SAID THIS NOW SEEMS TO 
BE IN PROGRESS.  ISRAEL, HE SAID, WOULD LIKE A STRONG CEN- 
TRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON, AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE 
LIAISON WITH THE LEBANESE ARMY.  BUT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE, 
AND THERE IS LITTLE HOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE FORESEEABL 
FUTURE.  KIMCHE THEN DESCRIBED THE INTERFACTIONAL FIGHTING 
WITHIN LEBANON,  NOTING THAT IT APPEARS THAT ALL FACTIONS 
ARE NOW FIGHTING WITH ALL OTHERS, FOLLOWING A RECENT 
REPORT OF A SHIA-DRUZE CONFLICT THIS MORNING. 
- 
9.  JAZZIN 
-   ------ 
KIMCHE SAID THAT JAZZIN COULD BE THE NEW FLASHPOINT.  HE 
SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAD NEVER TOLD OR 
ADVISED THE SLA TO GO TO JAZZIN, AND FURTHER 
ADVISED THE SLA THAT IF IT DECIDED TO GO TO JAZZIN, 
ISRAEL WOULD NOT HELP THE SLA BECAUSE JAZZIN IS OUTSIDE 
THE SECURITY ZONE.  THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAD PROPOSED 
TO UNIFIL THAT IT DEPLOY TO JAZZIN, SINCE IT HAD FORCES 
CLOSE BY.  HE SAID THE GOI WOULD WELCOME A UNIFIL DEPLOY- 
MENT TO JAZZIN AND WOULD ADVISE THE SLA TO WITHDRAW IN 
THAT CASE.  THE UN SECRETARY HAD THOUGHT THIS WAS A GOOD 
IDEA AND TRIED IT OUT WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL.  GEMAYEL 
ALSO, ACCORDING TO KIMCHE, THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD IDEA 
BUT DECLINED TO REQUEST A UNIFIL PRESENCE IN JAZZIN 
BECAUSE HE KNEW HE COULDN'T GAIN THE SUPPORT OF EITHER 
SYRIA OR HIS OWN PRIME MINISTER.  HE SAID THIS ALSO 
DEMONSTRATES THE WEAKNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. 
- 
10.  THE FINNS VERSUS THE SLA 
----------------------------- 
KIMCHE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW THE FACTS.  HE SAID THE 
INVESTIGATION WAS UNDERWAY, BUT IT APPEARED THAT THE UN 
STILL BELIEVES THAT THE ELEVEN SLA TROOPS DEFECTED. 
THE GOI, HE SAID, IS SKEPTICAL; IT BELIEVES THEY WERE 
ABDUCTED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS WHICH KIMCHE ADMITTED 
WERE CIRCUMSTANTIAL:  A) ALL OF THE ELEVEN LEFT THEIR 
FAMILIES BEHIND.  KNOWING THAT THE SLA IS NOT A GENTLE 
FORCE, THEY WOULD CLEARLY HAVE BEEN AFRAID FOR THEIR 
FAMILIES IF THEY HAD VOLUNTARILY DEFECTED.  B) SHORTLY 
AFTER THE SLA ELEVEN WERE MOVED TO TYRE, AMAL LEADER 
NABIH BERRI SAID THAT HE WOULD EXCHANGE THE ELEVEN 
PRISONERS FOR THE SHIA PRISONERS HELD IN ISRAEL.  KIMCHE 
SAID IT WOULD BE RARE INDEED TO OFFER TO EXCHANGE 
DEFECTORS FOR OTHER PRISONERS.  C) HE THEN SHOWED A TV 
FILM MADE BY A SYRIAN CREW JUST AFTER THE ELEVEN REACHED 
TYRE.  THE CAPTIVES WERE SHOWN BEING HELD UNDER ARMED 
GUARD, SULLEN, APPARENTLY FEARFUL, AND RESPONDING TO 
ORDERS BY THEIR GUARDS.  KIMCHE SAID THIS APPEARED NOT TO 
BE THE DEMEANOR OF PERSONS WHO HAD VOLUNTARILY DEFECTED. 
- 
11.  KIMCHE CONCLUDED THIS SESSION BY NOTING THAT ISRAEL 
MAY NEVER KNOW THE TRUTH, BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAE 
WANTS THE FINNS RELEASED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.  HE SAID 
THAT ALL THAT ISRAEL WANTS IS PEACE ON THE NORTHERN 
FRONTIER. 
 
12.  AMBASSADORS' COMMENTS 
-------------------------- 
THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THERE WAS A PRESS REPORT 
THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WOULD CONTEMPLATE A MOVE OF 
UNIFIL TO THE BORDER UNDER AN ARRANGEMENT AGREED TO WITH 
THE SLA.  KIMCHE SAID THE UN HAD PRESENTED SOME IDEAS TO 
THE GOI ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT TO THE 
BORDER WITH THE DE FACTO COOPERATION OF THE SLA.  NO 
DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED, AND THE SUBJECT WAS NOT 
THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED IN THE RABIN/URQUHART MEETING 
YESTERDAY.  HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE MEANTIME, UNTIL 
SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT IS WORKED OUT, ISRAELI POLICY, AS 
DETERMINED BY THE CABINET, REMAINS.  HE ADDED HOWEVER, 
THAT ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY IDEAS FOR 
STRENGTHENING THE STABILITY OF THE BORDER AREA. 
- 
13.  THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE EC-10 HAD MET 
AND HAD MADE A GENERAL STATEMENT ON LEBANON.  HE SAID THE 
FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN CONSIDERED THE INCIDENT VERY 
SERIOUS.  THEIR OPINION WAS THAT EVERY MEASURE SHOULD BE 
TAKEN TO FREE ALL HOSTAGES.  AMBASSADOR TALIANI ADDED A 
PERSONAL NOTE SAYING THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO 
ACCEPT ISRAELI DISCLAIMERS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN VIEW OF 
THE FACT THAT ISRAEL HAD ARMED AND EQUIPPED AND CONTINUED 
TO PAY THE SLA.  KIMCHE REPLIED THAT GIVING ASSISTANCE 
DOES NOT MEAN CONTROL.  FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID, THE 3,000 
SOVIET ADVISERS IN SYRIA DO NOT MEAN THAT THE SOVIET 
UNION CONTROLS SYRIA.  HE SAID IF ISRAEL ACCEPTED THE 
ITALIAN AMBASSADOR'S PREMISE, THE IDF WOULD BE DOOMED TO 
STAY IN LEBANON IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CONTROL. 
- 
14.  THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR STATED THE STRONG DESIRE OF 
HIS GOVERNMENT TO HAVE THE FINNISH TROOPS RELEASED AS SOON 
AS POSSIBLE.  HE ADDED THAT HE FELT THAT THE GOVERNMENT 
OF ISRAEL HAS A STRONG RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RELEASE. 
 
15.  THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR INTERVENED AGAIN TO NOTE THAT 
IT WAS A VERY DANGEROUS PRECEDENT TO ACCEPT THE TAKING OF 
HOSTAGES.  HE SAID HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WAS VERY 
EXERCISED OVER THE HOSTAGE ISSUE.  HE SAID ANY ACTION THAT 
ENCOURAGES THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES IS BAD BOTH IN THIS CASE 
AND IN THE GENERAL SENSE.  KIMCHE SAID HE AGREED THAT ANY 
TAKING OF HOSTAGES IS BAD.  HE CONCEDED THAT PERHAPS 
ISRAEL COULD SEND IN ITS TROOPS TO FORCE THEIR RELEASE. 
BUT IF THE IDF DID GO IN, IT WOULD MEAN THE END OF THE 
SLA, AND THE GOI WOULD HAVE TO BE BACK IN LEBANON TO STAY. 
HE SAID ISRAEL HAS GIVEN STRONG ADVICE TO LAHAD THAT IT 
WAS WRONG TO HOLD HOSTAGES.  BUT HE ADDED THAT THE ELEVEN 
SLA TROOPS MAY ALSO BE AS MUCH HOSTAGE AS THE FINNS.  HE 
SAID THEREFORE THE ONLY LINE OF ATTACK IS TO FOLLOW UP ON 
THE LAHAD  PROPOSAL.  HE THEN URGED THE CONTRIBUTORS 
TO UNIFUL TO PRESS THE UN TO HAVE THE AMAL BRING THE 
ELEVEN TROOPS TO THE NEUTRAL ZONE SO IT COULD DETERMINE 
IF THEY WERE VOLUNTARILY DEFECTORS OR IN FACT CAPTIVES. 
 
16.  THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT 
WELCOMES THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, BUT ADDED 
THAT THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF LIAISON OFFICERS LEAVES 
THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL CONSIDERABLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT PRESENT.  HE SAID THE HOSTAGES SHOULD 
BE RELEASED WITHOUT CONDITIONS IMMEDIATELY. 
- 
17.  COMMENT - THIS WAS THE THIRD OF A SERIES OF MEETINGS 
THAT KIMCHE HAS HAD WITH THIS GROUP ON LEBANON.  KIMCHE 
STATED THE CASE WITH CLARITY AND PRECISION, BUT HIS 
AUDIENCE WAS NOT CONVINCED.  CONCERNING THE HOSTAGES, HE 
REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT ISRAEL COULD BE EITHER IN 
LEBANON OR OUT, AND IF OUT, ISRAEL COULD NOT FORCE LAHAD 
TO DO WHAT HE DIDN'T WANT TO DO.  BEHIND THIS DENIAL OF 
CONTROL OF LAHAD IS KIMCHE'S CONVICTION THAT TO TRY TO 
FORCE LAHAD WOULD MEAN THE END OF LAHAD AND LAHAD'S FORCES 
CLEARLY THIS IS A CARD WHICH ISRAEL HAS NOT BEEN WILLING 
TO PLAY.  IT IS ALSO CLEAR, AS KIMCHE IMPLIED SEVERAL 
TIMES, THAT ISRAELI POLICY ON SOUTHERN LEBANON IS SUBJECT 
TO CHANGE AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION SHIFTS.  BUT ISRAEL IS 
STILL COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING LAHAD IN GENERAL AND IN HIS 
CONFRONTATION WITH UNIFIL, AND IS UNWILLING TO FACE THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SLA.  IF THE SLA 
SHOULD CRUMBLE, THE PERES GOVERNMENT'S LEBANON  WITH- 
DRAWAL DECISION, UP TO NOW A VERY POPULAR ONE, COULD 
SPRING AGAIN INTO THE CENTER OF POLITICAL  CONTRO- 
VERSY HERE.  CERTAINLY SHARON AND HIS ALLIES WOULD MAKE 
THE MOST OF IT TO WEAKEN THE PERES GOVERNMENT AND FURTHER 
INHIBIT ITS ABILITY TO MOVE FORWARD ON EITHER THE EGYPTIAN 
FRONT OR THE PEACE PROCESS ISSUES NOW UNDER DISCUSSION. 
 
18.  BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
 
FLATEN


http://wikileaks.org/cable/1985/06/85TELAVIV8792.html

Wikileaks:SUBJECT: BOMBS IN WEST BEIRUT


R 141405Z JAN 85
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1346
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 00240 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: PTER LE
SUBJECT:  BOMBS IN WEST BEIRUT 
 
1.  (C)  SINCE THE SMUGGLER'S INN BLAST OF JANUARY 
9, THERE HAVE BEEN FOUR MORE BOMBINGS IN WEST 
BEIRUT, KILLING SEVEN MORE PEOPLE AND INJURING 
AS MANY AS 80 MORE.  IN ADDITION, A LARGE EXPLOSIVE 
CHARGE PLACED IN FRONT OF THE BUILDING HOUSING THE 
EMBASSY'S CHIEF POLITICAL SECTION LOCAL EMPLOYEE 
FAILED TO DETONATE WHEN ITS FUSE EXPLODED SUNDAY NIGHT. 
DETAILS FOLLOW. 
 
2.  (U)  THREE PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND 27 INJURED 
FRIDAY WHEN A BOMB EXPLODED OUTSIDE THE BANK OF 
BEIRUT AND ARAB COUNTRIES ON CORNICHE MAZRA' IN WEST 
BEIRUT.  EXPLOSION DEVASTATED THE INSIDE OF BANK, 
DUG A LARGE CRATER IN SIDEWALK, AND CAUSED EXTENSIVE 
DAMAGE TO VEHICLES AND OTHER BUILDINGS. 
 
3.  (U)  THREE BOMBS EXPLODED SATURDAY, KILLING 
THREE PEOPLE AND INJURING AS MANY AS 60.  TWO OF 
THE BOMBS, BOTH PACKED WITH NAILS, WENT OFF WITHIN 
FIVE MINUTES OF EACH OTHER IN THE PSP-CONTROLLED 
MUSSEITBEH AREA WHILE THE THIRD INJURED SIX PERSONS 
AND DAMAGED PROPERTY ON HAMRA STREET NEAR A PSP 
CHECKPOINT. 
 
4.  (C)  EMBASSY POLITICAL SECTION EMPLOYEE GABY 
AKKAR, A CHRISTIAN, SAID THAT UNLIKE BOMB WHICH 
DESTROYED HIS CAR LAST MONTH, HE IS CERTAIN THAT 
LAST NIGHTS ABORTED EXPLOSION WAS IMED AT HIM. 
HE SAID THAT CHARGE WAS PLACED DIRECTLY UNDER THE 
BALCONY OF HIS APARTMENT.  AKKAR SAID THAT HE IS 
NOW MAKING PLANS TO MOVE HIS FAMILY INTO THE EAST 
WHERE IT IS SAFE. 
 
5.  (C)  COMMENT:  LEBANESE PUBLIC FIGURES HAVE 
INEVITABLY ACCUSED ISRAEL OF BEING BEHIND BLASTS, 
WHILE THE SYRIAN BA'ATH PARTY HAS SINGLED OUT 
PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS.  JOURNALISTS RESIDENT IN 
THE WEST VARIOUSLY ATTRIBUTE THE BLASTS TO THE MUR- 
ABITUN, WHICH THEY SAY IS RETURNING TO THE AREA IN 
FORCE AND REINVIGORATING THE OLD MURABITUN-PSP FEUD, 
OR HIZBALLAH,SIGNS OF WHOSE PRESENCE THEY SAY ARE 
INCREASINGLY DAILY.  IN THIS REGARD, U.S. JOURNALISTS 
DESCRIBED THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN WEST BEIRUT AS 
HAVING SUNK TO TRULY HOBBESIAN LEVELS OF NASTINESS 
IN LAST MONTH, WITH THE COMBINATION OF CAR BOMBS 
AND ARMED ROBBERIES KEEPING MQST PEOPLE LOCKED 
INDOORS AT NIGHT.  THERE ARE PRESENTLY REPRESENTA- 
TIVES OF ONLY THREE AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA RESIDENT 
IN BEIRUT (ASSOCIATED PRESS, LOS ANGELES TIMES, 
AND NEW YORK TIMES); SOME OF THESE ARE THINKING ABOUT 
LEAVING. 
 
 
BARTHOLOMEW

http://wikileaks.org/cable/1985/01/85BEIRUT240.html

Wikileaks:SUBJECT: ISRAELI OFFICIALS DISCUSS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, YASSIN KILLING WITH USD ZAKHEIM

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001934 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2014 
TAGS: KWBG PREL PGOV MARR IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI OFFICIALS DISCUSS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, 
YASSIN KILLING WITH USD ZAKHEIM 
 
REF: A. TEL AVIV 1742 
     B. TEL AVIV 1741 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings that took place in the hours 
following the Sheikh Yassin assassination, USD Dov Zakheim 
discussed the targeted killing and Gaza disengagement with 
Ministers Olmert and Mofaz and MKs Steinetz and Sneh. 
(Selected GOI comments from these meetings reported reftels.) 
 Mofaz defended Yassin's killing, and said the GOI would 
continue such operations.  Sneh blasted the operation, which 
he characterized as typical GOI undermining of Palestinian 
moderates.  Mofaz and Olmert both focused on the issue of 
U.S. support for the disengagement plan, with Olmert 
predicting that President Bush would privately hint to Sharon 
that support would come after the U.S. election.  Sneh urged 
the U.S. to withhold its support until Sharon took a number 
of steps, including on settlements and outposts in the West 
Bank.  Steinetz said Sharon would have to refrain from any 
West Bank withdrawals if he hopes to win the support of 
Steinetz and other key Likud members.  Olmert suggested that 
Netanyahu and Shalom would back the PM.  Mofaz thought 
withdrawal would begin around the end of the year and 
continue until summer, 2005.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) Visiting Under Secretary of Defense Dov Zakheim 
discussed Gaza disengagement and the Yassin assassination in 
a series of meetings March 22 with Alternate Prime Minister 
Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, Knesset Foreign 
Affairs and Defense Committee Chairman Yuval Steinetz and 
Labor MK Ephraim Sneh.  The Ambassador and/or emboffs 
accompanied Zakheim to the meetings.  (Selected GOI comments 
from these meetings reported reftels.) 
 
-------------------- 
Yassin Assassination 
-------------------- 
 
3. (C) The meetings all took place the morning of Israel's 
targeted killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin.  Mofaz 
strongly defended the GOI decision to kill Yassin, and said 
Israel would continue carrying out such operations.  He 
accused Yassin of sending hundreds of suicide bombers to kill 
Israelis and called him "the Palestinians' Bin Laden."  The 
Ambassador asked Mofaz about the impact the killing might 
have on PM Sharon's attempts to get Egypt to play a 
significant role in Gaza withdrawal.  "We're going to fight 
Hamas, in any case," Mofaz replied, adding that Egypt even 
before the assassination had been interested only in 
low-level involvement, with no "responsibility" for 
Palestinian actions. 
 
4. (C) Sneh, while asserting that Yassin undoubtedly deserved 
his fate, criticized the GOI action, predicting that it would 
accelerate what he said was the movement of PA security force 
members towards the Hamas orbit.  Does the GOI, he asked 
rhetorically, want Hamas to rule Palestine?  An Islamic 
government, he said, would be intolerable, but the GOI is 
doing nothing to encourage moderate Palestinians to take 
over.  Olmert, who, as a member of the inner Cabinet, would 
have helped make the decision to kill Yassin, also commented 
that the assassination could have a problematic impact on the 
future of Gaza, citing the greater difficulty the GOI would 
have in coordinating with the PA over security issues related 
to the Israeli withdrawal. 
 
----------------------------------- 
U.S. Support for Gaza Disengagement 
----------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Mofaz said that he gained the impression from a visit 
to Washington the week before that the USG favors Sharon's 
Gaza disengagement plan and appreciates why Israel must take 
unilateral action.  From his own point of view, he saw the 
removal of settlements from Gaza improving Israel's overall 
security situation and giving the IDF greater flexibility. 
The plan, he said, preserves chances for the roadmap.  He 
said he hoped that U.S. support would help convince GOI 
members currently opposed to the plan to support it. 
 
6. (C) Olmert focused as well on the importance of U.S. 
support, but averred that he did not expect the U.S. to 
provide financial assistance for Gaza withdrawal.  The extent 
of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank under consideration 
was probably not enough to motivate strong U.S. support.  He 
did predict, however, that President Bush, in a one-on-one 
meeting with Sharon, would ask Sharon to trust him on the 
question of support on the withdrawal plan and Israel's 
rejection of a Palestinian "right of return" until after the 
U.S. election. 
 
7. (C) Sneh blasted what he called Sharon's "strategy behind 
the pullout," charging that Sharon's ultimate goal is to get 
assurances that Israel will be left alone on West Bank 
matters.  The result of Sharon's approach, he asserted, would 
be a "Hamastan" in the South to go along with the 
"Hizballahstan" that Israel already allowed to be created in 
the North. 
 
8. (C) Asked by Zakheim about the U.S. role, Sneh said the 
GOI could not "cynically" ask the U.S. for financial 
assistance.  To do so would be neither "respectful" nor 
"dignified."  For its part, Sneh continued, the U.S. should 
ensure that: 
 
-- There is no Hamas state in either Gaza or the West Bank; 
 
-- Israel dismantles outposts in the West Bank before 
proceeding with Gaza settlements; 
 
-- The separation barrier sticks "strictly" to the Green Line; 
 
-- The GOI "negotiates" with Dahlan and Gaza security figures 
in advance of Israeli departure from Gaza; 
 
-- The GOI does not pay "exaggerated compensation" to the 
7,000 or so Gaza settlers, as this would create an impossible 
precedent for removing the 100,000 or so West Bank settlers 
whom the GOI would have to move in any agreement on the West 
Bank; 
 
-- The status of West Bank settlements be negotiated 
(Comment: Sneh did not say with whom) before any settlers are 
removed from Gaza. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Internal GOI Politicking on Disengagement 
----------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Looking ahead to prospects for approval of Sharon's 
plan in the Cabinet, Olmert commented that Finance Minister 
Netanyahu's wishes were unclear, although many insiders 
believe that he's in favor of withdrawal from Gaza. 
Netanyahu does, however, appear to be worried about the U.S. 
position and his own prospects, as finance minister, for 
ending up stuck with the bill.  Olmert predicted that Foreign 
Minister Shalom, who has not taken a position yet, would 
ultimately come around to Sharon's plan.  He claimed that 
Shalom had come to realize after a recent meeting with some 
of his base supporters in the Yemenite Orthodox community 
that he could afford politically to back the PM. 
 
10. (C) Steinetz told Zakheim that he might ultimately be 
able to support the withdrawal, but only if it involves Gaza 
only, not the West Bank.  Israel, he said, could afford to 
take more security risks in Gaza than in the West Bank, which 
sits close to the most strategic places in Israel, e.g., 
Jerusalem, Ben-Gurion airport, and the economic centers 
around Tel Aviv.  If the withdrawal were limited to Gaza 
only, he predicted, no Likud members, or virtually none, 
would leave the party. 
 
-------------------- 
Withdrawal Logistics 
-------------------- 
 
11. (C) Mofaz said he hoped to begin the withdrawal from Gaza 
at the end of the year.  This would permit completion of the 
plan by the summer of 2005.  Zakheim asked why the process 
will take so long.  Mofaz replied that removal of the 
settlers, including "talking with them" and finding them new 
housing, would prove time-consuming.  Pressed by Zakheim for 
a budget estimate for withdrawal, Mofaz demurred, but finally 
said, "Maybe a few billion shekels.  I can't say if it's five 
or eight billion."  Sneh said he had the impression that Gaza 
settlers would move in roughly equal proportion to the Negev, 
to other parts of Israel, and to West Bank settlements. 
 
12. (C) Olmert said the GOI had no definite timetable for the 
withdrawal, although he thought it might begin after the U.S. 
election.  Should President Bush lose the election, the start 
could be delayed. 
 
13. (U) U/S Zakheim cleared this message. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
KURTZER

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/03/04TELAVIV1934.html

Israel slams door on UN Human Rights Council over settlement row .

Source RT


Israeli officials say a UN fact-finding mission “will not be allowed to enter” the country and its occupied territories. On Friday, the Geneva-based Human Rights Council appointed three officers to probe Israel’s West Bank settlement activity.

­The UN's top human rights body has commissioned three jurists to find out how Israel's West Bank settlements affect “the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people.” The body called on Tel Aviv “not to obstruct the process of cooperation.
This resonated harshly with Israel, who took no time to dub the mission “biased and flawed,” vowing not to support the officials.

 
"The fact-finding mission will find no cooperation in Israel, and its members will not be allowed to enter Israel and the territories,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor. “Its existence embodies the inherent distortion that typifies the UN Human Rights Council's treatment of Israel and the hijacking of the important human rights agenda by non-democratic countries.

 
Israel cut all ties with the council in March after the 47-nation body passed a resolution establishing the settlement probe. Israel accuses the commission of a “disproportionate focus” on Israel.

 
"The establishment of this mission is another blatant expression of the singling out of Israel in the UNHRC," a Foreign Ministry statement said on Friday.

 
Now that the team is to be prohibited from Israel, it will have to gain evidence from second-hand sources, like local media.

 
But even if the mission finds that the settlements violate human rights, any attempts to punish Israel will most probably be defused by the US, Israel’s key ally.

 
The UN considers Israeli settlements illegal under international law. The Human Rights Council says Israel's plans to build more houses in the West Bank and East Jerusalem undermine the peace process and pose a threat to the two-state solution.

 
The West Bank settlements are at the core of dispute between Israelis and Palestinians. Some 500,000 Israelis and 2.5 million Palestinians live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, a territory that Israel expropriated from Jordan in 1967. Palestinians claim the West Bank is part of their future state, and object to any settlements there.

Israel cites historical and biblical links to the West Bank, saying the status of the settlements should be decided in peace negotiations.

 

Wikileaks:SUBJECT: VANUNU, UPON RELEASE, CLAIMS U.S. AGENT LURED HIM

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002327 
 
SIPDIS 
 
UNVIE FOR IAEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2009 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PGOV PHUM PREL IS ISRAEL RELATIONS GOI INTERNAL
SUBJECT: VANUNU, UPON RELEASE, CLAIMS U.S. AGENT LURED HIM 
TO 1986 CAPTURE 
 
 
Classified By: Pol/C Norm Olsen for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Immediately upon his April 21 
release from prison, "nuclear spy" Mordechai Vanunu charged 
that the woman who lured him into a Mossad trap in 1986 
worked for the CIA or FBI.  Nevertheless, Vanunu told the 
press that he would like to emigrate to the U.S.  The head of 
the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, Gideon Frank, defended 
the GOI's restrictions on Vanunu's liberty in an April 20 
discussion with visiting U/S Bolton, charging that Vanunu is 
out to "destroy" the Dimona nuclear facility.  In an earlier 
discussion with the Ambassador, however, Frank's deputy 
accused the head of the MOD internal security service of 
acting like a Communist security apparatchik in his campaign 
against Vanunu.  Recent articles have maintained that the 
security establishment is motivated by a desire to conceal 
its own bumbling in failing to prevent the original Vanunu 
leaks, although an Israeli journalist speculated that 
Vanunu's lawyers were peddling this story.  In placing 
onerous restrictions on Vanunu's liberty, the GOI appears to 
be elevating Vanunu's international cult status rather than 
protecting its nuclear program or national security.  END 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
----------------------------- 
Vanunu Drags the U.S. Into It 
----------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Mordechai Vanunu, the former low-level technician at 
Israel's Dimona reactor who revealed details of Israel's 
nuclear program to the Sunday Times of London in 1986, 
claimed, upon his April 21 release from 18 years in prison, 
that the woman who lured him into a Mossad kidnapping trap in 
Rome in 1986 was an agent of the CIA or FBI, not the Mossad. 
Nevertheless, he told Israel Radio -- in English, because he 
is refusing to speak Hebrew -- that he would like to emigrate 
to the United States, marry, and study and teach history. 
Leaving little doubt that he intended to remain a nuisance 
for the GOI, Vanunu told a crowd of supporters, opponents and 
journalists outside the gates of the Shikma prison in 
Ashkelon that he had been mistreated in prison because of his 
conversion to Christianity.  He also called for opening 
Dimona to international inspections. 
 
3. (U) Vanunu's hope to leave Israel will be blocked, at 
least for now, by a GOI decision to deny Vanunu a passport. 
Vanunu has also been barred from communicating with 
foreigners, entering embassies, approaching an airport or 
other point of international egress, or talking with anyone 
about his experiences at Dimona.  He will not be allowed to 
leave the city in which he chooses to live, reportedly the 
Jaffa section of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, without authorization. 
Vanunu reportedly intends to challenge these restrictions in 
court. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Top Nuclear Bureaucrats Split on Handling Vanunu 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
4. (C) In an April 20 discussion with visiting Under 
Secretary John Bolton, the head of the Israel Atomic Energy 
 
SIPDIS 
Commission, Gideon Frank, defended the restrictions on 
Vanunu, while acknowledging that they may prove 
unenforceable.  Frank charged that Vanunu "acted like a spy" 
during his last months as an employee at Dimona and that he 
clearly still intended to "destroy Dimona."  Frank noted that 
Vanunu, as a low-level technician, had not had access to a 
lot of sensitive information about Dimona, but worried that 
Vanunu would simply invent and spread lies.  Moreover, Frank 
added, not all the information that Vanunu leaked to the 
Times had made it into print. 
 
5. (C) Frank's deputy, Eli Levite, expressed a very different 
view of the GOI restrictions on Vanunu in a March 3 
conversation with the Ambassador.  He said that Yehiel Horev, 
the head of the MOD internal security department (MALMAB), 
whose responsibilities include Dimona, was the driving force 
behind the GOI campaign to restrict Vanunu's liberty and had 
argued for keeping Vanunu in administrative or home 
detention.  Noting that Horev had held the same position 
since the period of the Vanunu leaks, Levite commented that 
Horev had come to resemble "those who held similar positions 
for 18 years in former Communist countries."  Israel is a 
democracy, Levite said, and should therefore leave Vanunu 
alone now that he has paid his debt to society. 
 
--------------------- 
Security Service CYA? 
--------------------- 
 
6. (C) Recent articles in Ha'aretz and Yedioth Ahronoth 
suggested that Horev and other members of the GOI security 
establishment sought to restrict Vanunu in order to prevent 
revelation of their lapses in not stopping Vanunu before he 
leaked to the Times.  In a discussion with emboffs, an 
Israeli journalist not involved in either of the reports cast 
doubts on this version of events.  The fact that two 
newspapers ran the story suggested, he said, that Vanunu's 
lawyers had been peddling the story. 
 
7. (C) COMMENT: The GOI is only contributing to the 
international cult around Vanunu in its continuing campaign 
against him.  Vanunu's revelations in 1986 did nothing to set 
back Israel's nuclear program, and we have difficulty 
imagining that anything he says or does today could harm the 
program or otherwise damage Israeli national security.  As 
Ha'aretz defense commentator Reuven Pedatzur wrote, Vanunu is 
"a strange man with strange ideas who committed a very 
serious crime for which he was tried and imprisoned for a 
lengthy period....  Leave Vanunu alone.  Simply ignore him. 
Don't turn him into a cultural hero." 
 
8. (U) U/S Bolton did not have an opportunity to clear this 
message. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
KURTZER

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/04/04TELAVIV2327.html

Wikileaks:SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON MAJOR GAZA/WEST BANK USAID PROJECTS IN LIGHT OF SECURITY SITUATION

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002056 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA BURNS/SATTERFIELD AND NEA/IPA, USAID FOR KUNDER AND 
MCCLOUD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2009 
TAGS: EAID KPAL KWBG ASEC IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS HUMANITARIAN AID
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON MAJOR GAZA/WEST BANK USAID 
PROJECTS IN LIGHT OF SECURITY SITUATION 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
This is a joint message from Ambassador Kurtzer, 
Consul-General Pearce and USAID Director Garber. 
 
1. (C)  Summary/Recommendations:  On January 30, Chiefs of 
Mission in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and the West Bank/Gaza 
USAID Mission Director decided jointly to put an eight-week 
hold on four USAID projects to allow time to: 1) measure 
progress in the investigation of the October, 2003 murder of 
our security personnel in Gaza; 2) measure progress in 
Egyptian-sponsored security planning; and 3) evaluate whether 
it would be possible to manage major projects without 
participation of American citizen employees or contractors. 
The projects put on hold were the Gaza water carrier and 
desalination plant, the Bani Naim water project in the West 
Bank, and emergency road repair projects affecting mostly 
Gaza.  On March 26, the same group met and concluded that 
virtually no progress could be reported in the murder 
investigation and the Egyptian security plan has been put on 
hold as the instability and insecurity in Gaza has grown in 
the last eight weeks.  On the third issue, it is not 
desirable but it is possible to waive virtually all use of 
direct hire or contractor Amcit personnel in carrying out the 
projects. 
 
2. (C) Recommendations:  The Embassy, ConGen, and USAID 
Mission differ on next steps, and offer three distinct 
recommendations: 
 
--  The Embassy, (with overall responsibility for U.S. 
government activities in Gaza), believes that given the 
continued lack of progress in the Gaza murder investigation, 
and the continuing lack of workable security arrangements in 
Gaza, the USG should suspend the Gaza water carrier and 
desalination projects, as well as road repair in Gaza.  While 
the conditions in the West Bank are not as bad as in Gaza, 
the Embassy also believes that suspension of the Bani Naim 
water project will send an important signal to the 
Palestinian Authority.  The Embassy is deeply concerned that 
to go on with business as usual will signal to Palestinians 
that no cost is associated with killing Americans in Gaza. 
 
--  The USAID Mission for the West Bank and Gaza believes 
that the Bani Naim and road projects should go forward and 
would have either the two water projects proceed subject to 
starts and stops due to security concerns, or reprogram the 
money for other uses in the West Bank/Gaza assistance effort. 
 The USAID mission believes other means could be used to 
leverage progress on the investigation, that operations could 
proceed through actively managing security concerns, and that 
the greater U.S. interest is in averting a humanitarian 
crisis in Gaza, which could contribute to even greater 
instability.  The USAID mission believes it can adequately 
address the oversight issues within very severe security 
constraints on travel by AMCIT direct hire or contract 
personnel. 
 
--  The Consulate-General, (with overall responsibility for 
Jerusalem and the West Bank as well as the policy dialogue 
with the Palestinians), agrees for security reasons with 
Embassy recommendation that the Gaza water and road projects 
be deferred or canceled.  But it concurs with USAID that the 
Bani Naim water project should proceed, using local 
contractors to the maximum extent possible, and subject to 
ongonig monitoring of the security situation.  Similarly, the 
proposed West Bank road projects, on which local contractors 
will do the work, should proceed.  The ConGen notes that the 
USG threat to suspend or cancel assistance projects in the 
WB/Gaza has had virtually no demonstrable impact on the 
security behavior of the PA, and questions whether actual 
cancellation will provide additional leverage.  If all the 
projects are canceled without distinguishing among the 
differing level of risk each poses, we may send not only a 
signal to the PA on security, but also a signal to the 
Palestinian populace that the USG does not care about its 
basic humanitarian needs.  It could also signal the donor 
community that the USG is disengaging from assistance, which 
could spark similar actions by other donors and worsen the 
situation on the ground. 
 
Given contractual decisions that must be made on the water 
carrier project in the very near future, we request prompt 
Washington consideration of this matter.  Posts will supply 
any additional inputs required. 
 
(End Summary/Recommendations) 
 
--------------- 
Security Issues 
--------------- 
 
3.  (C) In early December of last year, the USG put the 
Palestinians on notice on the relationship between security 
issues and our ability to carry out major USAID projects. 
This theme has been reiterated constantly since to senior 
Palestinian interlocutors.  At the meeting of the Ad Hoc 
Liaison Committee (for Palestinian assistance) held in Rome 
on the 10th of December, NEA Assistant Secretary Burns told 
the group: 
 
I want to speak plainly about the importance the United 
States attaches to investigating the murder of three of our 
diplomatic colleagues in Gaza last fall.  We are still 
waiting for results in that investigation.  Without progress, 
culminating in the arrest and conviction of those 
responsible, we simply cannot carry out our full range of 
assistance projects for the Palestinian people.  Without a 
more secure working environment, moving forward with large 
scale programs -- such as the long-planned Gaza water 
infrastructure projects, and millions of dollars in road 
repair money ready to be disbursed in the spring -- will be 
impossible. 
 
Neither of the two conditions stated by A/S Burns had been 
met when we reviewed them as of January 30 and neither has 
been met two months later.  Promises of major developments in 
the investigation have been made at some junctures with no 
results.  A security court trial of suspects, who may or may 
not have been directly involved, was scheduled and then 
canceled.  The investigation is further hindered by lack of 
trust and coordination between the Palestinian security 
services.  Arafat's role has been at best unclear; at times 
he has given orders to spur further action while at other 
times he has reportedly viewed the investigation as a 
political enticement with which to lure the USG back into a 
relationship with him. 
 
4.  (C)  Meanwhile the overall security environment in Gaza 
has deteriorated, with the Palestinian security leaders 
advising for the last three months that they are not in 
control and that travel by U.S. Government personnel in Gaza 
remains quite risky.  The killing of Sheikh Yassin further 
exacerbated the situation, with perceptions among many 
Palestinians that the USG condoned the killing.  At this 
time, no direct hire American staff are being permitted to 
travel inside Gaza, and with new threats at Erez, we have 
even stopped meetings just inside the border at the Abu 
Eskander guest house.  USAID American citizen contractors are 
sharply limiting their travel into Gaza.  Even travel by 
contractors could be halted if the missions in Tel Aviv or 
Jerusalem decided that it was no longer sustainable in a 
relatively safe manner. 
 
-------------------------------- 
The Projects and Their Oversight 
-------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The Gaza water projects will be the largest projects 
USAID has embarked on in its support for the Palestinians. 
The water carrier and desalination plant in Gaza are expected 
to cost about $65 million each.  Given the current security 
situation in Gaza, the prospect of direct-hire American staff 
being allowed to travel to Gaza to exercise oversight of 
these projects is very questionable.  USAID Washington has 
already agreed that these projects could be carried out with 
a very limited number of trips by U.S. direct hire staff. 
For example, perhaps only a trip by contracting officer and 
engineer at the end of the water carrier project (i.e., in 
2006 or 2007) to certify the project would be technically 
required.  Also the Gaza regional water carrier project could 
be broken up into smaller pieces and involve more local 
contracting.  While it would be preferable to have an 
American contractor providing engineering oversight on a 
daily basis, particularly the desalination plant, it would be 
possible, according to USAID Director, to waive such a legal 
requirement should it be decided to proceed under adverse 
security conditions, and to insist that the contractor retain 
instead a U.S.-trained, non-American engineer.  Obviously the 
absence of U.S. direct hire personnel to inspect and certify 
progress would not be ideal, but with a talented local staff 
and a qualified construction management firm Mission is 
willing to accept the risk.  (USAID Mission advises that 
USAID Washington is also prepared to accept the risk.) 
Oversight requirement would be more easily manageable for the 
Bani Naim project in the West Bank, and the roads projects 
could be carried out with very limited Amcit involvement. 
 
--------------------- 
Policy Considerations 
--------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  A robust assistance program, combined with 
diplomatic efforts to assure funding for the needs of the 
Palestinians, has been a consistent element of U.S. policy. 
This vector has been maintained even as the USG has assessed 
that the near term chances of significant progress on the 
political issues are minimal.  We have strongly supported 
revenue transfers by the Israelis.  We have urged other 
donors to address Palestinian needs, and we have done all we 
can to support reformers in the PA.   Thus, any decision to 
defer or forego a significant element of our assistance 
program would send a negative signal to the Palestinian 
reformers and to the donor community.  On the other hand, 
moving ahead with major projects absent resolution of the 
Gaza murders and a creation of a more secure environment 
would send a message to the Palestinian leadership and 
Palestinian terrorists that there is no cost for killing 
Americans.  However, we do not claim any success so far in 
use of an implicit "stick" in eliciting progress in the 
investigation or in prompting Palestinian security 
improvements.  Those PA reformers who understand the impact 
of such a decision have little or no influence on security, 
and those in charge of security and the investigation have 
little or no appreciation for the costs of canceling the 
projects.  We cannot rule out, however, that a clear cut-off 
of substantial programs would have a greater impact than our 
warnings to this effect have had so far. 
 
----- 
Costs 
----- 
 
7.  (C) The direct costs associated with any suspension of 
the four projects are minimal.  The water carrier project is 
the most advanced and would require an approximately $300,000 
cancellation fee and associated costs in demobilizing the 
construction management firm's operations here.  Such costs 
must of course be weighed against the security premiums 
associated with protective measures that would be required to 
carry out the projects in Gaza at this time.  We have not 
identified any significant costs related to the deferral of 
the other three projects. 
 
8. (C)  We recognize fully the humanitarian costs in not 
addressing or delaying solutions to the dire water situation 
in the WB/G, particularly in Gaza.  However, if we cannot be 
at least somewhat assured that these projects to alleviate 
the water problems can be carried out in safety, we would 
face both excessive construction costs and the prospect of 
more costly cancellation at a later date due to security 
problems.  Other donors are likely to be influenced by a 
suspension; some have scaled back their exposure in Gaza 
already.  In general, it will be more difficult to mobilize 
support for Palestinian needs, a role the United States has 
played for many years. 
 
---------------- 
Requested Action 
---------------- 
 
9.  (C)  We cannot take final decisions on these matters in 
the field.  The significant policy questions require a full 
airing in Washington and we will supply further inputs and 
elaborated arguments as requested for such consideration.  We 
would ask that such a deliberation take place as soon as 
possible, given the advanced stage of the contracting process 
for the Gaza Regional Water Carrier in particular and the 
need to issue an RFP for Bani Naim within the next couple of 
weeks, or risk losing $15 million in FY03 funds. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
LeBaron

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/04/04TELAVIV2056.html

Israel Is The Most Racist State In The Developed World.

Haaretz reports Israeli culture is no less toxic than fanatic Islam, and the country’s discriminatory attitude toward Mizrahi Jews and Arabs qualifies it for the title of “most racist state,” prominent Israeli author Sami Michael said on Monday.:
“Israel can claim the title of most racist state in the developed world,” Michael, who heads the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, said at the opening of an international conference of the Association for Israel Studies at Haifa University.
“More than 60 years after the establishment of the Israeli state, the rift between European and Mizrahi Jewry has not mended. It is reflected in racism and social gaps,” the author said.
“To this day people from Arab states are underrepresented in the state’s central institutions, especially academic and cultural ones,” he said.
The racism is encouraged by cabinet members and MKs, and fueled by increasing religious extremism in the country, he said.
Michael also criticized the social inequalities in Israel and what he characterized as the failure of the left to adequately contend with these issues.
“Israel is in danger unless its leadership understands it isn’t located in Europe’s tranquil north but in the Middle East’s seething center,” said Michael. “We may lose everything. Israel could be a transient construct, like the First and Second Temples.”
Michael said Israeli children are trained to hate the other.
“Israeli culture is no less poisoned than the fanatic Islamic factions,” he said.
“From kindergarten to old age we feed our children hatred, suspicion and disgust toward the stranger and the other, and especially toward the Arabs,” he said.
He called the occupation “disaster incarnate” for Israel.


http://warincontext.org/2012/06/26/israeli-author-israel-is-the-most-racist-state-in-the-developed-world/